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THE NOT-so-GREAT WRIT: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT
TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS REFLECTING THE CURRENT
DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FOR
STATE PRISONERS
INTRODUCTION:
THE EXPANSION AND CONTRACTION OF HABEAS CORPUS IN AMERICA

A writ of habeas corpus directs prison officials to bring a prisoner
before a judge to determine whether the prisoner is being held unlawfully.' Based on the simple idea that nobody should be confined in violation of the Constitution, 2 the writ does not require a court to determine a
prisoner's innocence or guilt, but the writ guards against illegal imprisonment.3 Therefore, while put into action by individual prisoners who
hope for their own release, the writ of habeas corpus functions as an important mechanism of enforcing structural reform within the criminal
justice system.4 In Anglo-American legal history, habeas corpus-The
the best and only suffiGreat Writ-"has been for centuries esteemed
5
cient defence [sic] of personal freedom.",
Despite the writ's acknowledged importance in "protecting constitutional rights," 6 the United States Supreme Court and Congress have substantially contracted the availability of habeas relief for state prisoners
over the last several decades. Two recent decisions by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,7 Herrera v. LeMaster8 and Johnson v. McKune,9 reflect the current difficulty state prisoners face in obtaining habeas relief. In Herrera, the Tenth Circuit held that a habeas
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 715 (7th ed. 1999); see Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236,
238 (1963) ("In England, as in the United States, the chief use of habeas corpus has been to seek the
release of persons held in actual, physical custody in prison or jail."); ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS
CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 1 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2001); RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE

§ 2.10 (2d ed. 1992).
2.
Deborah L. Stahlkopf, A Dark Day for Habeas Corpus: Successive Petitions Under the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 1115, 1118-19 (1998).
3.
See Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335, 336 (1968) ("[T]he great and central office of
the writ of habeas corpus is to test the legality of a prisoner's current detention."); Price v. Johnston,
334 U.S. 266, 291 (1948) ("The primary purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is to make certain
that a man is not unjustly imprisoned.").
4. See LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 425 (1999) ("Federal habeas corpus for state
prisoners is largely the product of the Supreme Court's efforts in the middle decades of this century
to improve the quality of state criminal justice.").
5. See ExparteYerger, 75 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1868).
6.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000).
7. This paper surveys the cases decided by the Tenth Circuit between September 1, 2001 and
August 31, 2002.
8.
301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2002).
9. 288 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2002).
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court, in assessing the harmlessness of a constitutional violation, is to
apply the less demanding harmless-error standard normally required in
habeas cases even when a state court fails to apply the required and more
demanding harmless-error standard on direct review. ° In Johnson, the
Tenth Circuit held that a habeas petitioner, convicted with the help of a
jury instruction later found unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court, could not have that subsequent Supreme Court decision
applied retroactively to his petition." Both of these cases, therefore, are
emblematic of the current contraction of habeas law, a trend that runs
counter to the general expansion of the writ's availability in American
legal history.
At the very beginning of our nation, the founding fathers recognized
the importance of habeas corpus as a safeguard against a new and powerful central government,' 2 and provided for its protection within the Constitution.' 3 Due to its position as "the symbol and guardian of individual
liberty,"' 4 the writ of habeas corpus has demonstrated a propensity for
progressive expansion.' 5 The United States Supreme Court recognized
the writ's capacity for liberal growth, noting in Ex Parte Yerger that "the
general spirit and genius of our institution has tended to the widening and
enlarging of the6habeas corpus jurisdiction of the courts and judges of the
United States."'1
The expansion of the writ of habeas corpus was particularly dramatic during two periods in American history. Immediately after the
Civil War, Congress created the statutory writ of habeas corpus, enabling
a prisoner tried in a state court to ask for a writ of habeas corpus in fed-17
eral court based on constitutional errors or violations of federal law.
Prior to this legislation, the writ only applied to federal prisoners, and to
the exclusion of state prisoners.' 8 This statutory expansion of the common law writ grew out of a concern that the defeated Southern states
were limiting the rights of black citizens. 19
10.
Herrera,301 F.3d at 1193-94, 1198-99.
Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1189-90, 1200 (considering whether to apply Sandstrom v. Montana,
11.
442 U.S. 510 (1979)).
12.
THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 154 (Alexander Hamilton) (M. Walter Dunne 1901) (noting
the importance of habeas corpus as a protection against the "the practice of arbitrary imprisonments," which Hamilton labeled one of the "favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny").
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl.2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
13.
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
14.
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968).
15.
See, e.g., Mercado v. United States, 183 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1950) ("[Hlabeas corpus
has long been regarded as a proceeding in which a liberal judicial attitude is peculiarly appropriate in
view of the broadly remedial nature of the writ.").
16.
Yerger, 75 U.S. at 102.
17.
Joseph L. Hoffman, Justices Weave Intricate Web of Habeas Corpus Decisions, 37 TRIAL

62, 62 (2001).
18.
Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 98-99 (1807).
Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New FederalismAfter the
19.
Anti-Terrorismand Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 337, 339 (1997).
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Then, nearly one hundred years later, the Warren Court further
transformed the statutory writ of habeas corpus with a series of decisions
that removed many of the practical procedural hurdles faced by state
prisoners. 20 These critical decisions altered the balance of power in the
field of criminal law2' and "the writ became an effective tool for enforcing federal constitutional standards in the states by allowing federal
courts to determine whether a state criminal prosecution fully complied
with the more exacting federal rules of constitutional criminal procedure. 22 As a result of the Warren Court's work, federal courts became
the watchdogs against constitutional violations in state courts. 23 However, the rapid expansion of habeas relief also led to a significant backlash-one that continues nearly forty years later. 24
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist reexamined
many of the principles of habeas relief established by the Warren
Court. 25 Through a series of cases in the early 1990s, the Court constricted the scope of the statutory writ of habeas corpus and reversed
many of the effects of the landmark decisions of the Warren Court. 6 The
decisions of the Rehnquist Court undeniably contracted the availability
of writs of habeas corpus. 27 Today, federal courts routinely deny the petitions of many prisoners with valid constitutional claims2 8 But despite
these limitations on habeas relief erected by the Rehnquist Court, Congress subsequently passed legislation creating another set of procedural
hurdles.29

20. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1963) (formulating a new test to be
applied in determining whether successor petitions would be dismissed; a successor petition would
be granted unless the petitioner had knowledge of a constitutional claim and yet purposely failed to
raise that claim); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99, 438-39 (1963) (holding that a procedural error
was not sufficient grounds for denying a petitioner habeas relief unless the state procedural rules
were "deliberately bypassed"); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963) (using the reasoning
from Fay to hold that a petitioner for habeas relief was allowed a full evidentiary hearing during the
collateral appeal to federal court, unless the petitioner deliberately bypassed state procedural rules).
21.
Hartman & Nyden, supra note 19, at 340,
22. Hoffman, supra note 17, at 62.
23.
Hartman & Nyden, supra note 19, at 340.
24. See id. at 342-52.
25. See id. at 342.
26. Id.; see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631-32, 638 (1993) (adopting a separate,
less stringent harmless error standard for collateral review); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1,
5-6 (1992) (changing the "deliberate bypass" standard of Faye v. Noia and Townsend v. Sain to one
of "cause and prejudice"); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-35 (1991) (limiting Fay v.
Noia by declining to review questions of federal law where the state court decision rests on independent state law grounds); McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991) (holding that the standard for evaluating successor petitions is also "cause and prejudice"); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
299-310 (1989) (implying that a decision of the Supreme Court is not to be applied retroactively to
habeas corpus cases, unless the decision announces a "new rule").
27. David Gottlieb & Randall Coyne, Habeas Corpus Practice in State and FederalCourts,
31 N.M. L. REV. 201, 201 (2001).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 202.
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In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act ("AEDPA") 3 ° in response to the bombing in Oklahoma
City. 31 Intending to stop "abuse of the writ," Congress designed the
AEDPA to bar habeas relief for certain claims.32 The AEDPA included a
bar on successive petitions, 33 a statute of limitations, 3a and a standard of
review. 35 Although some commentators feel that the AEDPA was merely
36
a codification of the Rehnquist Court's habeas corpus decisions, federal
statute's language with the excourts must still wrestle to integrate the 37
tensive case law regarding habeas corpus.
It was during this transitional period, marked by an ongoing contraction of habeas corpus and evolving judicial adaptation to the
AEDPA, that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the two cases
that are the focus of this survey. Herrera and Johnson reveal that the
Tenth Circuit adopted a strict interpretation of the rules surrounding the
statutory writ of habeas corpus and that the court is willing to aid in the
relatively recent contraction of the availability of habeas relief for state
prisoners. 38 Part I of this survey introduces the concept of harmless-error
standards and the Tenth Circuit's application of the current standard in
Herrera. Part II discusses the current limit on applying Supreme Court
decisions announcing new rules of criminal procedure retroactively to
habeas proceedings and the Tenth Circuit's analysis of retroactivity in
Johnson.
I. THE HARMLESS-ERROR STANDARD IN HABEAS CORPUS
PROCEEDINGS

A. Background: A History of the Harmless-ErrorStandardin Habeas
Corpus Proceedings
Even where a state admits in a habeas proceeding that a constitutional error was committed, the state can argue that the error was harmless. 39 Until recently, federal courts used the same standard for judging
constitutional violations during habeas proceedings as they used on di30.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
See Stahlkopf, supra note 2, at 1117.
31.
32.
Id.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)-(c) (2000).
34.
Id. § 2244(d)(1).
35.
Id. § 2254(d)(1).
36. See, e.g., Gottlieb & Coyne, supra note 27, at 202 (reporting Professor Gottlieb's opinion
that AEDPA "can be read primarily as a codification of much of the Court's work").
37.
See id. at 203 (discussing the difficulties federal courts face in trying to apply AEDPA's
bar on successive petitions given their prior decisions on the issue).
38.
See Herrera,301 F.3d at 1192; Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1187.
39. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 652 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("By now
it goes without saying that harmless-error review is of almost universal application; there are few
errors that may not be forgiven as harmless."); YACKLE, supra note 4, at 451 ("If federal courts
determine that prisoners' claims are meritorious, they nonetheless withhold relief if the error was
harmless.").
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rect appeal. 40 That standard required relief from a constitutional error
unless the state could prove the violation was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 41 The United States Supreme Court announced this high
standard in Chapman v. California,42 and emphasized the constitutional
importance of the harmless-error rule.43
In 1993, in Brecht v. Abrahamson,44 the United States Supreme
Court adopted a new standard for evaluating constitutional errors on federal habeas review. a In his murder trial, the defendant, Todd Brecht,
admitted that he shot his brother-in-law, but asserted that it was an accident.46 The prosecutor, however, presented Brecht's silence at the time of
his arrest as evidence of his guilt and the jury found Brecht guilty of
first-degree murder.4 7 On direct appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
set aside the conviction, finding that Brecht's constitutional rights were
violated by the prosecutor's use of Brecht's choice to exercise his Fifth
Amendment right to silence.4 8 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reinstated
the conviction even though it found that the State had violated Brecht's
due process rights because it found that the error was "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." 49
On habeas review, the district court used the same standard used by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court and found that the error was not "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt., 50 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit reversed, declaring that the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was only applicable to direct review. 5 Further,
the Seventh Circuit held that for habeas corpus review the test is whether
the error "had [a] substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. 52 The United States Supreme Court affirmed
the holding of the Seventh Circuit, 53 adopting the language originally
40. Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2409 (1993) ("In a
number of cases, the Court applied the Chapman test inhabeas corpus just as on direct review.").
See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579-80 (1986) (finding that a jury instruction that shifted the
burden of proof on the element of malice and that a prisoner challenged in a habeas proceeding did
not violate the Chapman test).
Graham v. Wilson, 828 F.2d 656, 660 (10th Cir. 1987) ("[A]n otherwise valid conviction
41.
should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the
constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." (quoting Deleware v. Van Arsdall,
475 U.S. 673, 681 (1996))).
42.
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21 (stating that the harmless-error standard protects rights "rooted
43.
in the Bill of Rights, offered and championed in the Congress by James Madison, who told the
Congress that the 'independent' federal courts would be the 'guardians of those rights."').
44.
507 U.S. 619, 619 (1993).
45. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 630-31, 637-38.
Id. at 624.
46.
47.
Id. at 624-25.
Id. at 625-26.
48.
Id. at 626 (quoting State v. Brecht, 421 N.W.2d 96, 104 (Wis. 1988)).
49.
50. Id.
Id.
51.
Id. at 626-27 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
52.
Id. at 639.
53.
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used in Kotteakos v. United States54 to assess errors that do not affect
constitutional rights." The Brecht decision leaves federal courts with two
different harmless-error standards: the more stringent Chapman standard
for direct review, and the less stringent Brecht standard for use during
habeas proceedings.56 The Court provided a 57detailed rationale for the
two-tiered system of harmless-error standards.
Writing for the majority of the justices on the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist distinguished the standard used for harmless error on direct
review from the standard federal courts are to use in habeas proceedings. 58 Because habeas review is limited to preventing serious breakdowns in the criminal justice system, the majority opinion adopted a less
stringent standard for harmless error in habeas proceedings. 59 The Court
identified "the State's interest in the finality of convictions that have
survived direct review within the state court system" as a principal rationale for having a separate harmless-error standard for collateral review.6° Applying the same standard to both types of review could lead to
"the frustration of 'society's interest in the prompt administration of justice."' 6 1 The Court was also concerned that it respect the interests of
comity and federalism.62 The Court also justified the dual standard on the
assumption that state courts would apply the more stringent Chapman
standard and thus it would be duplicitous for a federal court to apply the
63
same standard in habeas proceedings.
Just three years after the Court declared its new harmless-error
standard in Brecht, Congress handed the federal courts another potential
standard when it passed the AEDPA. 64 The AEDPA states that a federal
court shall not issue a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court, on
direct review of a conviction, has either used an "unreasonable applica65
tion" of, or come to a decision "contrary to," Supreme Court precedent.
In Herrera, the Tenth Circuit addressed two questions concerning the
application of harmless-error analysis during habeas review. 66 First, it
had to decide whether the standard articulated in Brecht remained intact

54.
328 U.S. 750 (1946).
55.
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65.
See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21; Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623.
56.
See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 627-39.
57.
Id. at 634.
58.
See id. at 637.
59.
60.
id. at 635.
61.
Id. at 637 (citing United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986)).
62.
Id. at 636.
63.
Id. ("[lit scarcely seems logical to require federal habeas courts to engage in the identical
approach to harmless-error review that Chapman requires state courts to engage in on direct review.").
64.
See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
301 F.3d 1192, 1195 n.6 (10th Cir. 2002).
66.
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or whether the AEDPA abrogated Brecht.67 Second, the court had to dedid
cide what standard to apply, Brecht or Chapman, when a state court
68
not apply the more stringent Chapman standard on direct review.
B. Whether the Harmless-ErrorStandardof Brecht Is Still Good Law
After the AEDPA
1. Tenth Circuit: Herrerav. LeMaster69
a. Facts
Ruben Robert Herrera was sentenced to life in prison after he was
convicted in a New Mexico state court "of first degree murder and aggravated assault.",70 On direct appeal, Herrera claimed that police officers
had illegally searched his home. 7' Therefore, he argued, the admission at
trial of evidence seized during the illegal search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.72 The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed that the
search warrant did not meet constitutional standards.73 Nonetheless, it
concluded the error was harmless.74 In reaching this conclusion, the New

Mexico Supreme Court did not use the "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard required by the United States Supreme Court in Chap75
man.
Herrera then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asking for
relief based on the illegal search.7 6 A magistrate recommended denying
relief, basing his conclusion on a Brecht analysis of the illegal search.77
The district court adopted this recommendation, and Herrera appealed to
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the passage of the
AEDPA eliminated the requirement of a Brecht harmless-error analysis. 78 Herrera hinged his argument on the ambiguous wording of the statute.79 Specifically, the AEDPA states that "[an application for a writ of
habeas corpus ...

shall not be granted... unless the adjudication of the

claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable applicationof clearly established Federallaw, as determined by

67. Herrera,301 F.3d at 1195 n.6.
Id.
68.
69.
301 F.3d 1192.
Herrera,301 F.3d at 1194.
70.
Id.
71.
72.
Id.
Id.
73.
74. Id.
75.
Id. (referring to the standard adopted in Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). The New Mexico
Supreme Court instead based its harmless error conclusion on State v. Moore, 612 P.2d 1314, 1315
(N.M. 1980). Id.
Id.
76.
Id. (noting the magistrate's recommendation that Herrera's petition be dismissed with
77.
prejudice).
Id.
78.
79.
Id. at 1194-95.
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the Supreme Court of the United States., 80 Herrera argued that the statutory requirements supplanted the standard articulated in Brecht.8' He
claimed he was entitled to habeas relief because the state court decision
was "contrary to clearly established federal law" because the court did
not use the required Chapman standard on direct review. 8 Herrera argued that because the statute does not require any analysis for a constitutional error beyond that required by the statute, Congress eliminated the
Brecht standard.8 3
b. Decision
In deciding whether the AEDPA eliminated the Brecht analysis and
created a new standard for harmless-error review in habeas proceedings,
the Tenth Circuit compared the language of the statute and the legislative
intent behind its passage with the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Brecht.84 The Tenth Circuit pointed out that the Supreme Court
recognized the importance of the principle that "collateral review is different from direct review" in habeas corpus jurisprudence. 85 The Supreme Court also identified four concerns that justify use of the less
stringent standard during habeas proceedings. 86 First is "the State's interest in the finality of convictions." 87 Second and third are concerns of
"comity and federalism." 88 The Court reasoned, in Brecht, that federal
review after a state court has already reviewed a case for constitutional
error would frustrate both the state's authority in the field of criminal law
and its efforts to enforce constitutional rights.89 Finally, granting the writ
liberally "'degrades the prominence of the trial itself,' and at the same
time encourages habeas petitioners to relitigate their claims on collateral
review.9°
The Tenth Circuit then compared this set of rationales to the concerns that led Congress to pass the AEDPA. 9' In order to assess Congress's intent, the Tenth Circuit looked to two recent Supreme Court
cases that identified the policy concerns underlying the passage of the
Act. 92 In one case, the Supreme Court declared that the "AEDPA's pur80. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added).
Herrera,301 F.3d at 1198-99.
81.
82. Id. at 1195 n.6.
83.
Id. at 1199. For example, the AEDPA does not require that the error had a "substantial
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (quoting
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
84. Herrera,301 F.3d at 1197.
85.
Id. (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 633).
86. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)).
90. Id. (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 127).
91.
Herrera,301 F.3d at 1198.
92.
Id. (referring to a case involving Michael Williams, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420
(2000), and a case involving Terry Williams, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)).
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pose [was] to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism,"
and emphasized that "[t]here [was] no doubt Congress intended [the]
AEDPA to advance these doctrines., 93 Furthermore, in another case, the
Supreme Court said that "Congress wished to curb delays, to prevent
'retrials' on federal habeas, and to give effect to state convictions to the
extent possible under law." 94 Equating this set of concerns with the rationales underlying the decision in Brecht, the Tenth Circuit held that the
AEDPA did not eliminate the harmless-error standard set forth in
Brecht.95 The court declared that if it held otherwise, it would frustrate
to "raise the bar with respect to availability of federal
Congress's intent
96
habeas relief."
2. Circuits Supporting the Decision of the Tenth Circuit in Herrera
Two other circuits have spoken explicitly on the issue of whether
the Brecht harmless-error standard still applies after passage of the
AEDPA.9 7 Both the First and Sixth Circuits agree with the Tenth Circuit
that Brecht remains the appropriate standard for federal habeas review of
the harmlessness of constitutional errors.98
99
a. First Circuit: Sanna v. Dipaolo

Sanna was convicted of first-degree murder.'0° He argued that he
was entitled to habeas corpus relief because the state court denied him
due process when it did not properly instruct the jury about all of the
effects a conclusion that Sanna was intoxicated might have on its verdict. 0 1 In addressing the possible constitutional error, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals noted the confusion about the survival of Brecht, then
summarily stated: "[W]e have consistently employed Brecht in cases
arising under the AEDPA. We reaffirm that praxis today and hold that
the Brecht standard applies in conjunction with the AEDPA amendments." 0 2 The court applied that standard and found that the instructions
did not have a substantial or injurious effect on the jury because the petitioner's defense at trial was mistaken identity and because the trial court
gave a supplemental 0instruction
that cured most of the problems with the
3
instructions.1
original

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
371 (6th
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 436).
Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 386).
Herrera,301 F.3d at 1200.
Id. at 1199.
See Sanna v. Diapaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2001); Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352,
Cir. 1999).
See Sanna, 265 F.3d at 14; Nevers, 169 F.3d at 371.
265 F.3d 1(1st Cir. 2001).
Sanna, 265 F.3d at 5.
Id.
Id. at 14 (citations omitted).
Id. at 15.
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14
b. Sixth Circuit: Nevers v. Killinger'

Nevers was convicted of second-degree murder. 10 5 He was a police
officer and the charge was widely publicized before the trial. 1°6 The trial
court, however, refused to grant Nevers a change of venue.'0 7 A district
court granted his petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus. 0 8 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that "when the issue
before the federal habeas court is the state court's finding of harmless
error, the test set out by the Supreme Court in Kotteakos and explicitly
reiterated in Brecht quite precisely captures Congress's intent as expressed in AEDPA and, therefore, continues to be applicable."'" 9 The
appellate court affirmed the district court's decision to grant Nevers the
writ based on extraneous influences on the jury, but reversed its "reasoning and conclusions . . . that Nevers was denied a fair trial because of
pretrial publicity."'" 10
3. Circuits Reserving the Question of Whether the AEDPA Eliminated the Brecht Harmless-Error Standard
a. Eighth Circuit: Whitmore v. Kemna"'
Defendant Whitmore was convicted of robbery in the first degree
and three counts of armed criminal action, based on an armed robbery of
a flower shop, and subsequently sentenced to eighty years in prison.' 12 In
Whitmore's appeal for post-conviction relief, the Missouri Court of Appeals found that the prosecution had unconstitutionally used Whitmore's
post-arrest silence and request for an attorney at his trial." 3 However,
utilizing the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, the court held that
the error was harmless." 4 Whitmore then applied for a federal writ of
habeas corpus." 15 The federal district court denied him relief under the
Brecht harmless-error standard. 1 6 However, the district court also questioned the continuing validity of the Brecht standard in light of the
AEDPA."17

104.
105.
106.
107.

169 F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 1999).
Nevers, 169 F.3d at 354.
Id.
Id.

108.

Id.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 371.
Id. at 354.
213 F.3d 431 (8th Cir. 2000).
Whitmore, 213 F.3d at 432.
Id. at 433.

114.

Id.

115.
116.
117.

Id. at 432.
Id. at 433.
Id.
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In reviewing the district court's use of the Brecht standard, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed similar doubts about the continuing vitality of the standard. 1 8 The court was "not convinced that the
AEDPA did not abrogate the requirement that federal habeas courts conduct a harmless-error analysis under Brecht." 9 The court commented
that the "AEDPA is unambiguous as to the scope of federal court review,
limiting such review (at least as compared with past practice) in order to
effect the intent of Congress to expedite habeas proceedings with appropriate deference to state court determinations."' 120 The doubts expressed
by the court, however, are dicta, since the court found that Whitmore's
2
conviction would stand under either the Brecht or AEDPA standards.' '
Three circuit courts have joined the Eighth Circuit in reserving
judgment about the continuing vitality of Brecht after the passage of the
AEDPA.
122
b. Second Circuit: Noble v. Kelly

In Noble, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals asked "whether a
federal habeas court should continue to apply Brecht or determine instead whether the state court's decision was 'contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of Chapman.'' 2 3 In that case, the defendant
was convicted of attempted murder after a trial court excluded the testimony of a witness who would have testified to the defendant's whereabouts at the time of the shooting at issue.1 24 The defendant requested
habeas relief on the ground that the trial court erred when it excluded the
witness's testimony. 2 5 The court did not decide which standard should
26
apply because it was able to find reversible error under either standard.
27
c. Fifth Circuit: Tucker v. Johnson'

In Tucker, the defendant was convicted of murder and "sentenced to
death."'' 28 He argued that he was entitled to habeas relief because the
prosecutor introduced an audiotape of the defendant's confession, which
included his confession to crimes that were not at issue in that murder
trial. 129 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the confusion over
whether "the standard in Brecht [was] still viable after the enactment of

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
246 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2001).
Noble, 246 F.3d at 101 n.5 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
Id. at 95.
See id.
Id. at 101 & n.5.
242 F.3d 617 (5th Cir. 2001).
Tucker, 242 F.3d at 619.
Id. at 628.
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the AEDPA."' 3 ° The court, however, sidestepped the issue of Brecht's
continued validity by finding that the defendant had not proven that he
was "entitled to relief under either standard."' 31 The court relied on the
guilt, and
defendant's "confession, the overwhelming evidence of [his]
32
the fact that the State did not emphasize the other crimes."'1
d. Seventh Circuit: Denny v. Gudmanson

33

Finally, in Denny, the defendant was convicted of murder after incriminating statements that his brother made were admitted at their joint
trial. 34 The Seventh Circuit expressed some doubt "that the Brecht standard . . . survived the passage of the AEDPA."'135 However, the court
decided not to "weigh in on the debate at this juncture."'' 36 It found that
admitting the statements the defendant's brother made was harmless unbecause the evidence of the defendant's guilt was
der the Brecht standard
137
overwhelming.
4. Analysis
Despite the potential that those circuits that express doubt about the
continuing vitality of Brecht could split the circuits, the general direction
of federal courts of appeals is toward affirming the view adopted by the
Tenth Circuit. The continuing vitality of Brecht after the AEDPA hardly
seems open to controversy. Congress intended to further comity, finality
of litigation, and federalism through the passage of the AEDPA,' 38 which
coincides with the Supreme Court's justifications for adopting the less
stringent harmless-error standard in Brecht.139 The Tenth Circuit was,
therefore, correct when it equated the policy concerns underlying the
AEDPA and Brecht.14° One might wish that the drafters of the AEDPA
would have paid more attention to the relevant language of Brecht and
directly addressed the issue of whether Brecht remained binding authority.1 4' Yet the statute's silence regarding Brecht may itself be an indication that the drafters intended to retain the Brecht standard. 142 However,
130.
Id. at 629 n.16.
131.
Id.
132.
Id. at 629.
133.
252 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2001).
134.
Denny, 252 F.3d at 898.
135.
Id. at 905 n.4.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 436.
139.
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635.
140.
See Herrera,301 F.3d at 1198.
141.
See Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to
Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L.
203, 222 (1998) (discussing the difficulty in interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), in light of the lack of
insightful legislative history and the drafters' vague and inconsistent statements on the topic).
142.
See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 784 (2001) (applying the AEDPA standard to a state
court's ruling and finding it not unreasonable, then commenting that relief would also not be available because Brecht analysis would lead to the same result).
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despite any shortcomings in the statutory language, one can hardly argue
against the notion that Congress intended the AEDPA to restrict the
availability of writs of habeas corpus. 143 As the Tenth Circuit noted, a
ruling that replaces the high bar of Brecht with an interpretation of the
AEDPA that expands the availability of habeas relief would frustrate the
legislators' intentions. nn
The lingering confusion about the effect of the AEDPA on the applicability of Brecht may have more to do with ideological opposition to
the Act itself than a misunderstanding of Congress's intent in limiting
habeas relief.1 45 In addition, the disagreement may stem from dissatisfaction with the ephemeral nature of harmless-error standards, ' 46
which involve statements that judges must struggle to "operationalize."'
C. Whether a Habeas Court Should Still Apply the Brecht Test If the
State Court Failed to Apply the Required Chapman Test on Direct
Review
Although the question of the continued existence of Brecht has created some confusion among the circuits, the second question addressed
by the Tenth Circuit in Herrera147 presented a knottier problem. In
Brecht, where the Supreme Court first formulated the less stringent standard for use in federal habeas proceedings, the state court had already
applied the more stringent Chapman rule on direct review. 148 The Tenth
Circuit, in Herrera, addressed whether the less stringent harmless-error
standard of Brecht applies in a habeas proceeding when
the state court
149
did not apply the Chapman standard on direct review.
50
1. Tenth Circuit: Herrerav. LeMaster1

a. Facts
Ruben Robert Herrera was sentenced to life in prison after being
convicted in a New Mexico state court of first-degree murder and aggra143. See Andrea A. Kochan, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996:
Habeas Corpus Reform?, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 399, 409 (1997) ("[It is evident that
prisoners' habeas rights are now bound by a myriad of stringent restrictions.").
144. Herrera,301 F.3d at1199.
145. See, e.g., Yin, supra note 141, at 206-07 (discussing the "virulent condemnation" of
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which limited the retroactive application of Supreme Court
decisions in habeas review and that some argue was codified in the AEDPA; identifying ideological
dissatisfaction as the possible source of the discomfort).
146.

See Sam Kamin, Harmless Errorand the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 17-19

(2002) (discussing the difficulties with different methods used by appellate courts to determine
whether an error was harmless).
147. Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1195 n.6 ("[W]e address on rehearing whether a federal court on
habeas review should assess harmlessness under Chapman or Brecht when the state court has failed
to apply Chapman.").
148. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at625-26.
149. Herrera,301 F.3d at 1195 n.6.
150. 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2002).
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vated assault.15' On direct appeal, Herrera argued that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated when the police illegally searched his
home. 52 The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed with Herrera, but
concluded the error was harmless. 5 3 In deciding that the constitutional
violation was harmless, the New Mexico Supreme Court did not use the
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard required by the United
States Supreme Court in Chapman. 54 Herrera then filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, asking for relief based on the State's illegal
search. 55 A magistrate recommended denying him relief, basing his conclusion on a Brecht analysis of the illegal search and finding that the
error did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."'' 56 Herrera argued that because the state
court had not analyzed the illegal search under the Chapman "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard, the harmless-error standard of Brecht should
not apply on collateral review in habeas proceedings. 57 Instead, he
claimed the federal
habeas court had to apply the more stringent Chap158
man standard.
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with Herrera and held
that Brecht applies even where the state court on direct review failed to
use the appropriate harmless-error standard. 59 In reaching its conclusion,
the Tenth Circuit relied principally on two authorities. First, the court
looked to the Supreme Court's opinion in Brecht.160 Writing for the majority in Brecht, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the "less onerous
harmless-error" analysis was better suited to "the considerations underlying our habeas jurisprudence. 161 Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, emphasized that the Brecht standard, while less stringent than the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of Chapman, is nonetheless "appropriately demanding."'' 62 In particular, Justice Stevens noted that the
Brecht standard still "places the burden on prosecutors to explain why
those errors were harmless; requires a habeas court to review the entire
151.
Herrera,301 F.3d at 1194.
152.
Id.
153.
Id.
154.
Id.
155.
Id. The court noted that it was not barred by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), from
reviewing Herrera's Fourth Amendment claim since he did not receive a "full and fair opportunity to
litigate his Fourth Amendment claim" since the state court failed to apply the Chapman standard in
reviewing the constitutional error at issue. Id. at 1195 n.4. Stone held that a state prisoner may not
raise a Fourth Amendment claim in habeas proceedings when the state "provided an opportunity for
full and fair litigation." Stone, 428 U.S. at 481-82.
156.
Herrera,301 F.3d at 1194.
157.
Id.
158.
Id. at 1194-95.
159.
Id. at 1200.
160.
Id. at 1199.
161.
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623.
162.
Id. at 641 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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record de novo in determining whether the error influenced the jury's
deliberations; and leaves considerable latitude for the exercise of judgment by federal courts.' 63 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the "broad
language" used in the opinion indicated the Court's intention to make
Brecht applicable to all federal habeas review of state court decisions,
164
whether or not the state court applied Chapman on direct review.
The Tenth Circuit also relied on dicta from a Supreme Court case
that was decided after Brecht.165 In Penry v. Johnson,166 the Supreme
Court reviewed a habeas petition made by a prisoner who claimed that
his Fifth Amendment rights had been violated during a trial in a state
16 7
Because the state court did not find that the State had violated
court.
the constitution, it did not undertake a harmless error analysis. 168 The
Supreme Court agreed there was no constitutional violation, but added in
dicta that if the State had committed such an error, the proper test for
harmlessness during habeas review was the Brecht standard. 169 Even
though Penry never received the benefit of the Chapman standard on
direct review, the Court indicated that it was willing to use the Brecht
standard on collateral review. 170
171
2. Eighth Circuit: Orndorffv. Lockhart

a. Facts
Michael Ray Orndorff was convicted of murder. 7 2 After he appealed his conviction to the Arkansas Supreme Court, he discovered that
the prosecutor had hypnotized a key witness to aid her recall. 173 The state
court did not conduct a harmless error analysis under any standard because Orndorff did not discover the constitutional violation until after his
direct appeal ended. 174 Orndorff petitioned for habeas relief based on the
argument that the state violated his "[S]ixth [A]mendment right to confront the witnesses against him" by preventing him from questioning the
witness about the hypnosis. 175 The federal district court agreed that the
State committed a constitutional error when it did not inform Orndorff of

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 640-41 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Herrera,301 F.3d at 1199.
Id. at 1199-1200.
532 U.S. 782 (2001).
Penry, 532 U.S. at 793.
See id. at 791.
Id. at 795.
Id.
998 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1993).
Orndorff,998 F.2d at 1428.
Id. at 1429.
Id. at 1430.
Id.
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the hypnosis, but found the error harmless, upheld the murder conviction
176
and denied habeas relief.
b. Decision
On review of the district court's denial of habeas relief, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals began by addressing the question of whether
the Brecht harmless-error standard applies, where the state court failed to
apply any prior harmless-error standard at all.177 The Eighth Circuit held
that the Brecht harmless-error standard only applies where the state court
has conducted an analysis under the Chapman harmless-error standard
on direct review. 178 In reaching this conclusion, the court first looked at
the facts underlying the Supreme Court's holding in Brecht.179 The
Eighth Circuit noted that courts reviewed the constitutional errors in
Brecht four times under the Chapman standard before the case reached
the Supreme Court. 180 The Eighth Circuit also found support for the limited application of Brecht in the Supreme Court's strong assertion that
"[s]tate courts are fully qualified to identify constitutional error and
evaluate its prejudicial effect on the trial process under Chapman."' 8' In
other words, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that a primary rationale for
mandating the high bar of Brecht for collateral review was the assumption that the state court would apply the lower bar of Chapman on direct
review.1 82 The Eighth Circuit, therefore, applied the harmless error standard of Chapman since the appellate court was the first court to address
the violation of Orndorff s constitutional rights. 83 The Eighth Circuit
concluded that the testimony of the witness who had been hypnotized
reversed the
might have influenced the jury's decision and, consequently,
84
district court's decision to deny Orndorff habeas relief.'
3. Other Circuits Supporting the Decision of the Tenth Circuit in
Herrera
The Eighth Circuit is swimming against the tide of federal court
opinion. Six other circuits have addressed the applicability of the Brecht
harmless error standard when there is no Chapman analysis on direct
review.185 All six have come out in favor of using Brecht even when the
176. Id.
177. Id.
Id.
178.
Id.
179.
180.
Id. (explaining that the analysis was conducted by two state appellate courts, a federal
district court, and a federal court of appeals).
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 636).
181.
Id.
182.
183.
Id.
Id. at 1436.
184.
185.
See Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941 (3d Cir. 1998); Hogue v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 466
(5th Cir. 1997); Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1996); Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d 1519
(10th Cir. 1995); Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1995); Horsley v. Alabama, 45 F.3d 1486
( lIth Cir. 1995).
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state court did not use the proper harmless-error standard on direct review. 186 In addition, two other
circuits have expressly declined the oppor187
tunity to rule on the issue.
188
a. Third Circuit: Hassine v. Zimmerman

In Hassine, the petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and
other crimes after a prosecutor made two references in his closing arguments to the petitioner's silence after he was arrested. 89 The Third Circuit gave four reasons for holding that the less stringent harmless-error
standard of Brecht applies on habeas review even when the state court
failed to use the more stringent Chapman standard on direct review. 19°
First, the court looked to the plain language of the Brecht decision and
noted that the Supreme Court "never restricted the issues or the holding
in Brecht to situations where a petitioner has already had his or her claim
evaluated by the state courts under Chapman."'9'
Second, the Third Circuit separated the facts of Brecht from the
holding. 92 It noted that the "holding was based primarily on a finding-apart from the particular facts or history of the case--that 'the costs of
applying the Chapman standard on federal habeas outweigh the additional deterrent effect, if any, that would be derived from its application
on collateral review."' ' 93 The Third Circuit claimed that the Supreme
Court in Brecht was driven primarily by concerns about the "nature and
purpose of collateral review" and that those concerns were never explicitly linked to an assumption about whether or not a court performed a
Chapman analysis on direct review. 194
Third, the court in Hassine rejected the notion that the policy concerns identified in Brecht only come into play when a habeas court repeats the same harmless-error analysis conducted by the state court on
direct review.' 95 The Third Circuit reasoned that those concerns do not
turn on the repeated application of the same standard, but instead on the
fact that a state court has "rejected a defendant's direct appeal.' 96

186. Hassine, 160 F.3d at 953; Hogue, 131 F.3d at 500; Sherman, 89 F.3d at 1142; Brewer, 51
F.3d at 1529; Tyson, 50 F.3d at 446; Horsley, 45 F.3d at 1492.
187. See Lyons v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 499 (2d Cir. 1996); Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034 (9th
Cir. 1996).
188.
160 F.3d 941 (3d Cir. 1998).
189. Hassine, 160 F.3d at 945.
190. Id. at 951-53.
191.
Id. at 951.
192. See id.
193. Id. (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 636).
194. Id. at 952.
195.
Id. at 952-53. The Supreme Court was concerned with comity, federalism, and showing
respect for the ability state courts to interpret the Constitution in Brecht. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 620,
636.
196.
Hassine, 160 F.3d at 952.
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Lastly, the Third Circuit expressed concern about the practical effects of using Chapman in every habeas case where the state court failed
to use Chapman.197 In most circumstances a state court will not have
found constitutional errors and, therefore, will not have occasion to use
Chapman.'98 The court, therefore, reasoned that "any rule requiring
Chapman to be used when the state courts fail to address harmless error
would render Brecht inapplicable to the majority of habeas petitions."' 99
200

b. Fifth Circuit: Hogue v. Johnson

In Hogue, the petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. 20 ' No state court reviewed the petitioner's claim that the State had
committed a constitutional error during his trial. 202 The Fifth Circuit accepted Brecht as the appropriate harmless error standard even when a
state court had not conducted a Chapman analysis.20 3 Specifically, the
Fifth Circuit noted that "the reasons given by the Supreme Court in
Brecht for adopting the Kotteakos v. United States harmless error standard for federal habeas review of nonstructural constitutional errors in
not the state courts
state criminal cases are fully applicable whether or
'2 4
have conducted a Chapman harmless error review. 0
4. Analysis
The principal objection to the decision in Herrera, and to the reasoning of the six other circuits that agree with that decision, is that it
affords disparate treatment to similarly situated habeas petitioners. The
Herreradecision leaves open the possibility that some habeas petitioners
will receive an analysis of their constitutional claims under Chapman's
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, while others simply will not. Justice White recognized this discrepancy and expressed his disfavor in his
dissent in Brecht.20 5 He commented that "the same constitutional right is
treated differently depending on whether its vindication is sought on direct or collateral review. 2 °6 In other circumstances, the Supreme Court
has strongly opposed such inequality. 2 7 Justice Powell, concurring in
Hankerson v. North Carolina,20 8 said that treating similarly situated defendants disparately "hardly comports with the ideal of 'administration

197.

Id. at 953.

198.

Id.

199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
131 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 1997).
Hogue, 131 F.3d at 469.
Id. at 499.

203.

Id.

204.
205.

Id. (citation omitted).
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 649 (White, J., dissenting).

206.

Id.

207.
315.
208.

See, e.g., Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 247 (1977); Teague, 489 U.S. at
432 U.S. 233 (1977).
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of justice with an even hand."",20 9 In Teague v. Lane,2 10 another seminal
habeas corpus decision,2 1' Justice O'Connor stated that "the harm caused
by the failure
to treat similarly situated defendants alike cannot be exag' 212
gerated.
The federal courts may have found it easy to disregard the inherent
inequality of inflexibly applying Brecht to all habeas proceedings because they suspect that when courts apply them there is little practical
difference between the two standards. The Tenth Circuit seemed to argue
this point in Herrera when it pointed out that the Supreme Court had
stated that "[g]iven the critical importance of the faculty of judgment in
administering either standard, however, that difference is less significant
than it might seem., 21 3 However, the Tenth Circuit takes seemingly inconsistent positions by vigorously defending expansive application of the
Brecht standard while at the same time arguing that it really does not
make a practical difference in habeas proceedings.
II. RETROACTIVITY IN HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS
The second major habeas issue recently addressed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concerns the issue of retroactivity of Supreme Court decisions to habeas petitions filed before the
relevant change in the law. In Johnson v. McKune,2 14 the Tenth Circuit
held that it would not apply a Supreme Court decision that found a Kansas jury instruction unconstitutional retroactively to the habeas petition
of a man who was convicted after a court gave a jury that instruction.2 5
A brief examination of the history of retroactivity doctrines is necessary
in order to understand the full significance of that holding.
A. Background: A History of Retroactivity Doctrines in Habeas Corpus
Proceedings
Retroactivity-whether a new rule should control the outcome of
cases decided before the new rule was announced-has a long been the
subject of debate in legal circles.21 6 William Blackstone expressed a view
that is known as the declaratory theory, which posits that the duty of a
judge is not to "pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the
209. Hankerson, 432 U.S. at 247 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244, 255 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
210. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
211.
Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied? - A Comment on Recent Proposals to
Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1665, 1701 (1990). "A series of decisions, beginning with the seminal Teague v. Lane in February 1989, have now established that no
new rule of criminal procedure may be announced or applied retroactively by habeas courts unless it
falls within one of two very narrow exceptions." Id. (citation omitted).
212. Teague, 489 U.S. at 315.
213. Herrera,301 F.3d at 1198 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 643).
214. 288 F.3d 1187 (2002).
215. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1200.
216. Yin, supra note 141, at 210.
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old one."2t 7 The strength of the declaratory theory had the simple idea
that if "a law was declared unconstitutional," then it "should never have
been the law. 21 8 In contrast to the declaratory theory is the notion that
judges do not find law, but actively make it.2 19 The tension between those
two theories has played out repeatedly through the years, as judges have
had to decide between applying new rules retroactively or only prospectively.22 °
The struggle between retroactive and prospective applications of
law in the context of habeas proceedings emerged in the Supreme
Court's decision in Linkletter v. Walker.22 1 In Linkletter, the Court faced
the question of whether Mapp v. Ohio,222 which extended the rule that
excludes evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
states, applied retroactively to collateral appeals.223 Police officers
searched the petitioner's home and "place of business" and seized evidence without the authorization of a search warrant. 22224 The petitioner was
convicted of robbery.225 The state supreme court and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction; however, a year later, the United
States Supreme Court decided Mapp.226 The petitioner then applied for
habeas relief, but was denied such relief by both the state and federal
courts. 227 In holding that Mapp did not apply retroactively, the Court held
that future
questions of retroactivity need to be decided on a case-by-case
basis.228
In two strongly worded opinions in the years following Linkletter,
Justice Harlan argued against this case-by-case determination of retroactivity. 229 Instead, he advocated for separate standards for direct and col-

217.
Id. at 210 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *69).

218.
Id. at 211.
219.
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 191 (Henry Hart ed.,
1954) (1832).
220. Yin, supra note 141, at 211.
221. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
222. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
223. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636.
224. Id. at 621.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 629 ("Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision retrospectively, we must then weigh the merits and demerits in each
case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.").
229. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (pointing to
the "incompatible rules and inconsistent principles" of Linkletter and urging the creation of different
rules for cases that are subject to direct review at the time of the new decision and for cases that are
subject to collateral review); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court should bar retroactive application of new
rules on collateral review, except for rules with a substantive effect on due process or that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty").
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lateral review. 3 ° On collateral review, Justice Harlan argued, new rules
should never be retroactively applied unless they are "new rules of substantive due process" or "watershed procedural rules." 23'
Twenty-two years after Justice Harlan's dissent in Mackey, a plurality of the Court adopted his retroactivity analysis.232 In Teague v.
Lane,233 a black man was convicted of attempted murder and other
crimes by a jury made up entirely of white people.234 A district court
denied him habeas relief even though a prosecutor used all of his peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors who were black. 235 A circuit court also denied the petitioner relief because it concluded that he
was not entitled to rely on a discrimination case that the Supreme Court
had decided since the district court's judgment of conviction.
The Supreme Court held that new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure are generally not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review.237 The Court then defined a "new rule" as one that "breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government" or one that was not "dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant's conviction became final. 238 However, the Court created
two exceptions to this general standard of nonretroactivity. 239 A new rule
may be retroactively applied if it places "certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe" or if it "requires the observance of
those procedures that
240
...are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
The Court identified two policy concerns supporting this hard line
on retroactivity. 24' First, the Court noted the burden that applying decisions retroactively places on states, requiring them to "marshal resources
in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed
to then-existing constitutional standards. 242 Second, a conservative approach to retroactivity respects the desire states have to see final resolutions of their criminal proceedings.243

230.
Desist, 394 U.S. at 263 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679-80, 691-93
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
231.
Yin, supra note 141, at 216.
232.
See id.at 219.

233.
234.
235.

489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Teague,489 U.S. at 292-93.
Id.at 293.

236.
237.
238.

Id.at 294.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 301.

239.

Id. at 311.

240.
Id. at 307 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (Harlan, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part) (quoting Mackey,401 U.S. at 693).
241.
Id. at 310.

242.

Id.

243.

See id.
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In practice, a Teague retroactivity analysis typically involves two
steps. 244 First, a habeas court determines if the Supreme Court holding
under consideration announced a new procedural rule.245 If not, then the
holding can be applied retroactively. 24 Second, if the holding is considered a new rule, the reviewing court must decide if the rule fits within
either of the two Teague exceptions. 247 If the Supreme Court decision
falls under one of the two exceptions, then it can be applied retroactively
on collateral review. 48 If not, then the Supreme Court decision will not
be applied retroactively to the habeas proceeding.2 49 The
250 Tenth Circuit
engaged in this two-step analysis in Johnson v. McKune.
B. Whether the Supreme Court'sDecision in Sandstrom Announced a
New Rule
251
1. Tenth Circuit: Johnson v. McKune

a. Facts
A jury found Noble Leroy Johnson guilty of murder in 1976 and
sentenced him to life in prison.252 At the trial, the jury received an instruction concerning the intent element of the crime of murder, which
stated: 'There is a presumption that a person intends all the natural and
probable consequences of his voluntary acts. This presumption is overcome if you are persuaded by the evidence that the contrary is true. 253
Two years after Johnson made a direct appeal to the Kansas Supreme
Court,254 the United States Supreme Court held, in Sandstrom v. Montana, that the type of jury instruction given in Johnson's case violates
255
theCgiven rs case
the Due Process Clause. In particular, the Court expressed concern that
a juror "could easily have viewed such an instruction as mandatory. 2 56
Further, such instructions potentially shift the burden of persuasion, forcing the defendant
to prove he "lacked the requisite mental state" to com257
mit the crime.
In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Johnson argued that his
due process rights had been unconstitutionally violated because the state
244. See Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1195-96.
245. Id.at 1196.
246. Id. at 1197.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 1199-1200 (holding that the decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510
(1979), was neither a "wellspring" principle nor a "watershed rule," therefore it was not to be applied retroactively in collateral review proceedings, and Johnson's claim was properly denied).
250.
288 F.3d 1187, 1195-1200 (10th Cir. 2002).
251.
288 F.3d 1187.
252. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1189.
253. Id. at 1191.
254. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
255. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 518-20.
256. Id. at 515.
257. Id. at 524.
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had been improperly relieved of the burden of proving the intent element
of the crime he was charged with committing.2 58 The success of Johnson's petition hinged upon a retroactive application of the holding in
Sandstrom since at the time of Johnson's conviction and direct appeal,
Sandstrom had not yet been decided and, therefore, the jury instruction
that the court gave in his case was not considered unconstitutional.259 In
Johnson's habeas proceeding, the federal district court applied the twopart analysis dictated by Teague and declared that (1) Sandstrom announced a new rule, and (2) the rule did not fall within one of the two
exceptions to the general rule of nonretroactivity. 26
b. Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's decision.26 ' In deciding that Sandstrom created a new rule, the
Tenth Circuit looked both to the language in Teague and to other Supreme Court decisions that expounded upon the definition of a new
rule.262 In Teague, the Supreme Court declared that a rule meets the standard for newness if it "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation
on the States or the Federal government" or if it "was not dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. ' ' 263 In other words, a rule is not new where a trial court, even before
the actual formulation of the rule, would nonetheless "have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [the defendant]
,,214
seeks [to have a court apply] was required by the Constitution.
Applying the Supreme Court's definition of a new rule to the Sandstrom holding, the Tenth Circuit found no persuasive indications that the
decision "was dictated or compelled by precedent as contemplated by
Teague." 265 The court acknowledged the strong influence that the Su267
266
preme Court decision In re Winship had on the Sandstrom ruling.
Winship held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. 268 However,
the Johnson Court determined that the Supreme Court's admittedly
heavy reliance on Winship in Sandstrom did not rise to the level of compulsion required by Teague to find that a rule was not new. 269 Therefore,
258.
259.
260.
261.

Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1189,1193.
Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1189-90.
Id. at 1189.

262.

Id. at 1195-97.

263.
264.

Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
O'Dell v. Netherand, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997).

265.
266.

Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1196.
397 U.S. 358 (1970).

267.
268.
269.

Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1196.
Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1196.
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in the Tenth Circuit's opinion, the Supreme Court's holding in Sandstrom
pronounced a new rule.
c. Judge Henry's Dissent
Judge Henry concluded that Sandstrom did not create a new rule for
the purposes of a Teague analysis. 71 Judge Henry analyzed three previous Supreme Court decisions and determined that the combination of
those holdings compelled the result in Sandstrom.272 In Winship, the Supreme Court held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the accused] is
charged.,273 In Morissette v. United States, 74 the Court held a jury instruction that allowed the jury to presume intent to steal based on the
defendant's voluntary act of taking property unconstitutional. 275 Finally,
in Mullaney v. Wilbur,27 6 the Court charged the government with proving
that there was no heat of passion in a murder case in order to comply
with the Due Process Clause.277 According to Judge Henry, the combined
weight of those Supreme Court decisions should have dictated the result
in Sandstrom.278 Therefore, in his opinion, the Sandstrom decision was
"hardly surprising" and should not be labeled a new rule in the context of
a Teague analysis. 79
2. Other Circuits Finding that Sandstrom Announced a New Rule
Apart from the Tenth Circuit, three other circuit courts have decided
that the rule articulated in Sandstrom was a new rule for the purpose of
analyzing whether to apply a rule retroactively.280 However, none of
those three courts explored the issue as fully as the Tenth Circuit did,
which led Judge Henry to question the strength
of their agreement with
28
the Tenth Circuit in his dissent in Johnson. 1
282
a. Sixth Circuit: Cain v. Redman

Cain was convicted of first degree murder.2 83 At his trial, the judge
instructed the jury that the law implies the malice necessary to convict a
270. See id.
271.
Id. at 1203 (Henry, J., dissenting).
272. Id. (Henry, J., dissenting) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 491 (1990)).
273. Id. (Henry, J., dissenting) (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 364).
274. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
275. Morrissette, 342 U.S. at 275-76.
276. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
277. Johnson,288 F.3d at 1204.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1204, 1205.
280. See, e.g., Cain v. Redman, 947 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1991); Prihoda v. McCaughtry, 910
F.2d 1379 (7th Cir. 1990); Hall v. Kelso, 892 F.2d 1541 (11 th Cir. 1990).
281.
Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1202-05.
282. 947 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1991).
283. Cain, 947 F.2d at 818.
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defendant of murder when a defendant "killed another suddenly without
provocation." 284 The district court dismissed a petition that Cain filed for
a writ of habeas corpus based on a magistrate's conclusion that a court
could not apply Sandstrom retroactively to his case.285 In Cain, the Sixth
Circuit held the rule articulated in Sandstrom was a new rule because the
jury instruction that the Court invalidated in Sandstrom was very prevalent just prior to the Court's decision.286 The circuit court reasoned that
the constitutionality of the instruction was 'susceptible to debate among
reasonable minds. 2 87 The sheer number of jurisdictions not recognizing
any Supreme Court precedent that would compel the invalidation of the
jury instruction led the Sixth Circuit to conclude that the decision in
Sandstrom created a new rule of criminal procedure. 88
2 89
b. Seventh Circuit: Prihodav. McCaughtry

Prihoda petitioned for habeas relief from his convictions of armed
robbery and murder in the first degree.290 He argued that the trial judge
gave a pattern instruction to the jury that shifted the burden from the
State to him and required him to prove that he did not intend to kill the
person whose death was at issue.291 A district court dismissed Prihoda's
petition.29 2 Prior to Prihoda's petition, the Seventh Circuit had on three
occasions held that the pattern instruction the trial court gave in Prihoda's case did not violate the Constitution. 93 Based on these decisions,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that a state court would not have concluded that the instruction was unconstitutional under the precedent that
existed at the time Prihoda's conviction became final. 294 The Court in
Prihoda declared, "[a]ny federal decision holding instruction 1100 unconstitutional therefore would be a new rule for purposes of Teague and
could not be applied on collateral review." 295 The circuit court affirmed
the district court's decision.2 96
297
c. Eleventh Circuit: Hall v. Kelso

Hall was convicted of felony murder after a trial court instructed a
jury that "acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id. at 819.
Id. at 819-20.
Id. at 821.
Id.
Id.
910 F.2d 1379 (7th Cir. 1990).
Prihoda,910 F.2d at 1381.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1382.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1387.
892 F.2d 1541 (1 lth Cir. 1990).
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be the product of the person's will."' 298 A district court denied Hall a writ
of habeas corpus.29 In a footnote, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that
Sandstrom created a new rule. 300 The court held "that Teague [was] no
bar to the application of Sandstrom"30' because the rule developed from
Sandstrom is a "bedrock, axiomatic and elementary [constitutional] principle" 30 2 that "diminishes the 'likelihood of an [in]accurate conviction. ',303 The Eleventh 3Circuit
reversed the district court's decision to
4
deny Hall habeas relief.
30 5
3. First Circuit: Mains v. Hall

Robert Mains was convicted of first degree murder and "unlawfully
carrying a firearm." 306 He petitioned for habeas relief twice.30 7 In his
second petition Mains claimed that the instruction the trial judge gave the
jury about the malice element of murder violated the Due Process Clause
because it shifted the burden of proof from the State to him. 30 8 The district court dismissed the second petition and Mains appealed to the First
Circuit Court of Appeals. 30 In Mains, the First Circuit wrote that since
Sandstrom was a "lineal descendant of Winship," it could not be classified as a new rule. 0 Winship held that the state bears the burden of proving all of the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 31 1 The
holding in Sandstrom, according to the First Circuit, simply applied the
premise articulated in Winship to jury instructions that create presumptions of facts.312 In other words, the court concluded that presumptive
jury instructions violate the Constitution in the precise manner prohibited
by Winship if they relieve the state of its burden of persuading the jury of
each element of a crime charged.3 13 Therefore, the Sandstrom holding
was not a "new rule" and the circuit court affirmed the district court's
decision.31 4

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Hall, 892 F.2d at 1542.
Id. at 1543.
Id. at 1543 n.1.
Id.
Id. (quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211,213 (1988)).
Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313).
Id. at 1543.
75 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 1996).
Mains, 75 F.3d at 11.
id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 14 (quoting Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 343 (1993)).
Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
Mains, 75 F.3d at 14.
See id.
Id. at 14-15.
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4. Analysis
a. Tenth Circuit's Reliance on Holdings from the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits
The Tenth Circuit's reliance on the Seventh Circuit and Eleventh
Circuit is unjustified due to its misreading of both cases. In particular
Prihodadid not involve the type of jury instruction at issue in Sandstrom
and Johnson,31 5 while the court in Hall never addressed whether or not
Sandstrom was a new rule.31 6 In Prihoda,the Seventh Circuit stated that
any rule making jury instruction 1100 unconstitutional would constitute a
new rule.3 17 In order to equate the Prihoda holding with the Johnson
holding, the jury instructions at issue in those cases must both be similar
to the instruction found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Sandstrom. However, the jury instruction at issue in Prihodadoes not correspond to the type of instruction held unconstitutional in Sandstrom.3 18 In
fact, the Seventh Circuit had previously ruled that the jury instruction
used in Prihoda remained valid after Sandstrom.3 19 Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit's citation of the ruling in Prihoda as support for the notion that
Sandstrom created a new rule seems tenuous at best.
The Tenth Circuit stated that in Hall, the Eleventh Circuit endorsed
the idea that Sandstrom created a new rule. 320 The Eleventh Circuit's line
32
of reasoning and identification of Sandstrom as a "bedrock" principle 1
indicates that the court merely assumed Sandstrom created a new rule
and jumped immediately to the second Teague question: whether Sandstrom fits within one of the exceptions to the general rule in Teague.322 In
prelimiother words, the Eleventh Circuit never squarely addressed the 323
nary question as to whether or not Sandstrom created a new rule.
b. Continuing Confusion Over What Rules Are New
The fact that the circuit courts of appeals disagree about whether
Sandstrom announced a new rule is not surprising, considering the difficulty the Supreme Court has had settling on a single definition of a new
rule.324 Commentators acknowledge the difficulty in applying the princi-

315.
Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1202 (Henry, J., dissenting) (calling the decision in Prihoda,"irrelevant to the question before our panel").
Id. at 1203 (Henry, J., dissenting) ("[The Eleventh Circuit had no reason to consider
316.
whether Sandstrom actually constituted a 'new rule."').
317.
Prihoda,910 F.2d at 1382.
318.
See Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1202 (Henry, J., dissenting).
319.
See Fencl v. Abrahamson, 841 F.2d 760, 770 (7th Cir. 1988).
320.
Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1196.
321.
Hall, 892 F.2d at 1543 n. 1.
322.
See Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1195-96.

323.

Id. at 1202-03 (Henry, J., dissenting).

324.
See RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 25.5 (4th ed. 2001).
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pie. 325 The source of the confusion can be traced to the plurality opinion
in Teague, which admitted that "[i]t is .. .often difficult to determine
when a case announces a new rule, 326 then provided two different concepts of what constituted a new rule.327 On one hand, the Court took a
restrictive view of new rules when it stated that a rule is new when it
"breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the
Federal Government." 328 On the other hand, the Court also adopted a
more inclusive standard when it said that a rule is new if it was "not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's convictions became final. 329 In the years since Teague, the Supreme Court has swung
back and forth between expansive and restrictive definitions of what constitutes a new rule. 330 The ambiguity of the definition and this oscillation
has created a myriad of intra-circuit and inter-circuit splits about the
categorization of several Supreme Court rules.33' Until the Supreme
Court takes an opportunity to settle upon a single definition of "new
rule," this trend of confusion among the circuits will likely persist.
C. Whether the New Rule in Sandstrom Fits Within One of Teague's
Exceptions
332
1. Tenth Circuit: Johnson v. McKune

Once the court concluded that Sandstrom was a new rule for the
purposes of Teague analysis, the general prohibition of retroactive use of
a new rule applied.333 In order to escape from this bar, Johnson claimed
3 34
that the second Teague exception applied to the Sandstrom rule.
Teague allows courts to retroactively apply any new rule that "require[s]
the observance of those procedures that.., are implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty., 335 The Tenth Circuit looked first to the Teague opinion
for further clarification of the boundaries of this exception. 336 It noted
that the Supreme Court took an extremely conservative approach to the
exception because it reserved the exception for "watershed rules of

325.
See, e.g., Richard Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1731, 1735 (1991) (pointing out that critics call the
new rule principle an "ill- defined and problematic legal concept").
326.
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
327. Id.
328.
Id.
329.
id.
330.

See HERTZ & LIEBMAN,supra note 324, § 25.5.

331.
Examples of Supreme Court holdings where the circuits have split over the issue of
whether or not the announced rule was new or not, include Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981),
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987), and Wainwright v.
Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986).
332.
288 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2002).
333. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1197.
334.
See id.
335.
Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 290).
336.
See id.
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The Court hoped to avoid the burden retroac-

tively applying new rules of criminal procedure would place on states.338
The Supreme Court expected
only "a small core of rules" to fit within the
339
second Teague exception.
The Tenth Circuit concluded the new rule was not a "watershed
rule." 34° Even though it acknowledged the possibility that the jury instruction the judge gave at Johnson's trial may have affected the reliability of the conviction,34 1 the Tenth Circuit held that the rule needed to also
meet the higher burden of "alter[ing] our understanding of the bedrock
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding." 342 The
court recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in Sandstrom, relying
as it did on the reasoning in Winship, was built upon a foundation of
"bedrock" principles of criminal procedure.343 In Yates v. Aiken,34 the
Supreme Court called Winship's requirement that a jury only convict a
defendant with proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every necessary fact
a "bedrock, axiomatic and elementary constitutional principle. 345 However, the Tenth Circuit distinguished between the building blocks of the
Sandstrom decision and the Sandstrom rule itself and declared that "[n]ot
every holding that draws on a wellspring rule is itself a wellspring holding., 346 The court concluded that the rule announced in Sandstrom lacked
the "primacy and centrality" that was needed
for the court to apply it
347
retroactively to Johnson's habeas proceeding.
348
2. Eleventh Circuit: Hall v. Kelso

In Hall, a jury convicted the defendant of armed robbery and felony
murder in the shooting death of a liquor store clerk.349 The trial judge
instructed the jury that "the acts of a person of sound mind and discretion
are presumed to be the product of the person's will. ' 350 The Supreme
Court had not decided Sandstrom and held such burden-shifting jury
instructions unconstitutional until after Hall had exhausted his direct
appeals. 351 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had to apply
Sandstrom retroactively in order to grant Hall's habeas petition.352 The
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).
Id. at 1195.
Id. at 1198 (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461,477 (1993)).
Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1198.
Id. at 1198-99 (quoting Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 666 (2001)).
Id. at 1199.
484 U.S. 211 (1988).
Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1199 (quoting Yates, 484 U.S. at 214).
Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1200 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).
892 F.2d 1541 (1
lth Cir. 1990).
Hall, 892 F.2d at 1542.
Id. at 1543.
Id. at 1543 n.1.
See id.
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court justified the retroactive application with the same set of Supreme
Court cases the Tenth Circuit used to argue against retroactive application.353 The Eleventh Circuit called the burden-shifting prohibition of
Sandstrom a "bedrock, 'axiomatic and elementary' [constitutional] principle, 354 and held 355
that Teague did not prevent it from applying Sandstrom retroactively.
3. Analysis
The fact that the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits made similar arguments, yet reached different conclusions about whether the rule against
burden-shifting jury instructions announced in Sandstrom should be applied retroactively to habeas proceedings, demonstrates that the resolution of this issue is not clear. Both courts compared the rule to the same
elusive terms "bedrock," "axiomatic," and "watershed. 35 6 Although
ideological differences between the judges who sit on the courts may
partly explain this polarization of opinion, the differences between the
facts in the two cases also stands out. In Johnson, the court did not indicate in its published opinion that Johnson's guilt was ever a question.357
The damning testimony of his wife, plus his own rambling testimony,
left little doubt that Johnson was responsible for the grisly murders of
two of his neighbors. 358 On the other hand, the potential that Hall was
innocent loomed in the background of his habeas proceeding. The court
included Hall's plausible story that he was simply in the wrong place at
the wrong time in its published opinion. 35 In fact, on direct appeal, the
Georgia Supreme Court reversed Hall's armed robbery conviction and
reduced his death sentence to life imprisonment. 360 Therefore, while the
purpose of a habeas proceeding is not to determine a prisoner's guilt or
innocence, 361 it is possible that habeas courts are in fact swayed by that
question. Despite the supposed uniformity of Teague's prohibition of
retroactive application of new rules, the practical differences between
that standard and Linkletter's requirement of case-by-case analyses may
be fewer than at first appear.

353.
See id. at 1543 n.1, 1543-44; Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1199. Both courts considered Winship,
Sandstrom, Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), and Yates. Hall, 892 F.2d at 1543 n.1, 154344; Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1199.
354.
Hall, 892 F.2d at 1543 n.1 (alteration in original) (quoting Yates, 484 U.S. at 214).
355.
Id.
356. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1199-1200; Hall, 892 F.2d at 1543 n.1.
357. Johnson, 288 F.3d 1187.
358.
See id. at 1190.
359. Hall, 892 F.2d at 1542-43.
360.
Id. at 1543.
361.
See Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335, 336 (1968) ("[Tjhe great and central office of
the writ of habeas corpus is to test the legality of a prisoner's current detention.").
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CONCLUSION

The English common law writ of habeas corpus gradually developed into "the symbol and guardian of individual liberty." 36 2 Its further
development has been slowed, and potentially reversed, by recent Supreme Court decisions and the passage of the AEDPA. As the two cases
from the Tenth Circuit that are analyzed in this survey reveal, the contraction has not yet ended. The Tenth Circuit has joined with other circuits in strictly interpreting the recent decisions of the Rehnquist Court,
making it increasingly difficult for state prisoners to obtain habeas relief.
In these two decisions, the Tenth Circuit let stand the use of an improper
harmless-error standard on direct appeal of a prisoner's conviction, and
allowed for the influence of a jury instruction that the Supreme Court
later struck down as an unconstitutional violation of due process. While
the net effects of these two decisions may be small by themselves, they
are representative of a larger trend within the American judiciary of attacking the foundations of the Great Writ.
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